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THE FIRST DECADE OF THE SHERMAN ACT:
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION*
WILLIAM LETWINI
As the first effort to control the economy at large, the Sherman antitrust
law 1 posed special problems for judges. Antitrust cases required more thor-
ough and delicate analysis of economic issues than had ever been needed in
resolving questions under the older branches of law. In some instances, they
called for a fuller understanding of monopolistic and competitive behavior
than economic theory could offer then, or can now. Controversies involving
large companies and the complex structure and widespread activities of whole
industries made it necessary to deal with voluminous records. But the greatest
difficulty, especially pressing through the early years, was not so much to
determine the facts of a case as to discover the meaning of the statute. When
the difficulties of arriving at a cogent interpretation of the Sherman Act are
considered, it is surprising that the courts were able, in less than a decade, to
formulate the fundamental rules of law that have since governed that statute's
application.
The gravest problems of interpretation arose from ambiguities in both the
legal theory and language of the act. It was based on the common law, and
judges generally agreed that it should be interpreted according to the common
law; yet they varied widely in their opinions of what the precedents dictated.
Their views could easily differ both because contradictory tendencies existed
within American case law and because English common law had steadily been
diverging from the more typical American precedents. The language of the
act aggravated the problem of interpretation. The first section of the act
declared illegal: "every contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint
of trade .... ,,2 Congress had intended by this concise formula to outlaw three
sorts of agreement known to the common law, each having a proper common-
law name: contracts in restraint of trade, combinations in restraint of trade,
and conspiracies in restraint of trade. The phrase, "or commerce among the
several states,"3 was appended to assert the constitutional power on which the
act rested. But the entire formula, commendable for its brevity, was for that
*The second of two articles by the author, dealing with the early history of the Sherman
Act. The first-concerning the Government's efforts to administer the new legislation-
appears in the present volume at page 464.
tAssociate Professor of Industrial History, M.I.T. School of Industrial Managament.
Formerly, Research Associate in the University of Chicago Law School's Antitrust
Project, under whose auspices the research for this Article was undertaken.
1. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7, 15 note (1952), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7
(Supp. V, 1958).
2. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. V, 1958).
3. Ibid.
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very reason dangerously equivocal. For one thing, it could be read as con-
demning "every... conspiracy, in restraint of... commerce among the several
states," though many agreements that might be so described-for instance a
malicious compact to derail a locomotive-would not have violated the com-
mon-law rules against monopoly. The word "every" also created doubts, for
it could be taken to mean that the act went beyond the common law, which
did not forbid "every" restraint of trade but only "unreasonable" restraints.
Uncertainty about the word "every" was contagious; judges who disagreed
about its significance were apt to differ next about the technical meaning of
the succeeding words, "restraint of trade." All these ambiguities had somehow
to be resolved before the act could be given a workable meaning.
THE- COMmON-LAw DoCTRINE OF EARLY CASES
The persistent difficulty of interpreting the act's common-law foundations
did not arise in the first antitrust suit brought by the Government, largely be-
cause the defendants in the Jellico Mountain Coal case 4 were joined in a com-
bination of quite traditional form. A group of coal dealers and mine operators
had organized the Nashville Coal Exchange, the mines agreeing to trade only
with dealers in the Exchange, and the dealers in return promising to buy only
from member mines; the Exchange set prices at which all members were to
sell and provided penalties for any disobedience. The court did not hestitate to
find that the arrangement violated the Sherman Act. Since the combination
would confine the sale of coal to members and prevent them from selling cheaply,
it clearly restrained trade. And since, according to the bylaws of the Exchange,
the established prices would not apply to coal sold to manufacturers and steam-
boats "until all mines tributary to this market shall become members of the
exchange, or until the exchange can control prices to govern coal used by
manufacturers," the group was clearly engaged in an "attempt to monopolize"
-- expressly proscribed by section 2 of the act.6 The heart of the decision there-
fore, was reached merely by comparing the words of the statute and the words
of the agreement.
In writing his opinion, Judge Key did not refer to precedents or offer much
explanation, and he disposed with equal dispatch of the defendants' further
arguments. They maintained, first of all, that the act was unconstitutional
because, while it created criminal offenses, it authorized the Government to
proceed by suits in equity, thus denying a defendant's right to trial by jury in
criminal cases. They argued secondly that the agreement did not affect inter-
state commerce: since all the coal mines were located in Kentucky and all the
dealers in Tennessee, the agreement to fix prices at the mines concerned com-
4. United States v. Jellico Mountain Coke & Coal Co., 43 Fed. 898 (C.C.M.D.
Tenn. 1890) (preliminary injunction refused), 46 Fed. 432 (C.C.M.D. Tenn. 1891)
(issued).
5. 46 Fed. at 434.
6. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. V, 1958).
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merce within one state and the agreement to fix retail prices concerned com-
merce within another. Finally, they contended that the prices charged in
Nashville were justified by the costs. The judge declined, however, to discuss
the constitutionality of the act. He easily found the requisite effect upon inter-
state commerce in the transportation from the mines in Kentucky to the dealers
in Tennessee; and he attached no weight to evidence about whether or how
much the combination had actually raised prices of coal, for the statute con-
demned the "attempt to monopolize," and he held that the Exchange agreement
was in itself such an attempt.
The Whisky Trust Cases
This easy conclusion was illusory. The application of the Sherman Act to
particular sets of facts required, after all, a more subtle process, as the whisky
trust cases of 1892 showed. The early stages of the proceedings dealt with
procedural matters. The original indictment charged that certain offenses had
been committed by the officers of the Distilling and Cattle Feeding Company,
popularly known as a trust, but in fact a corporation chartered by the state
of Illinois. These officers, having bought or leased seventy-eight distilleries
that produced about three-quarters of the spirits sold in the United States, had
offered certain dealers in Massachusetts rebates if they would buy only from
the trust. All this was done with the clear intent to monopolize. But since
the indictment, because of error or oversight, did not assert that these actions
illegally affected interstate commerce or violated the Sherman Act, the court
quashed it as failing to meet the requirement that defendants in criminal prose-
cutions be given a clear statement of the charges against them.7
In re Corning
When these defects were corrected in a new indictment, three courts in
various districts were asked to decide whether the defendants could be forced
to appear for trial in Boston. The judges then had to render summary judg-
ments based on the meaning of the Sherman Act. In the first of these proceed-
ings, In re Corning,8 Judge Ricks decided that the new indictment did not at-
tribute any crimes to the trust. The act prohibited "restraints of trade" and
"monopolizing," but the indictment did not describe any particular actions
corresponding to those terms. Thus, although the indictment charged the de-
fendants with buying up seventy distilleries, it did not assert that the defendants
obliged the sellers to refrain from building other distilleries or to give up the
business of distilling. And, though it alleged they offered rebates to any dealer
who would buy only their goods and sell only at their prices, it did not allege
that dealers were bound to those conditions by contract. Accordingly, the court
decided that the indictment did not accuse the whisky trust of making any
7. United States v. Greenhut, 50 Fed. 469 (D. Mass. 1892); see Letwin, The First
Decade of the Sherman Act: Early Administration, 68 YAIE L.J. 464, 473 (1959).
8. 51 Fed. 205 (N.D. Ohio 1892).
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agreements of the sort traditionally recognized by the common law as contracts
in restraint of trade. Nor did the indictment allege that the trust had made any
agreement with independent distillers to limit output, control prices, or circum-
scribe markets. In short, it did not accuse them of forming with their competitors
in what the common law traditionally identified as a combination in restraint
of trade. Judge Ricks added that, according to the common-law meaning of
''monopoly," the indictment did not support a charge on that ground: the
allegation was that the trust had accumulated a great deal of property, not
that it had done so in an illegal manner. Ricks therefore refused to order the
defendants to stand trial in Boston. His decision was closely followed by Judge
Lacombe, who heard the second case of the series, and delivered a short opinion
adding only one explanatory note-the statute did not prohibit "the actual
restraint of trade" but "the making of a contract in restraint of trade."9
Jackson's Opinion in the Greene Case
The doctrine implied by Ricks and Lacombe--that a business might be a
monopoly in fact and not a monopoly at law if it had become the sole producer
of a commodity without having done anything illegal to achieve or retain its
control-was stated explicitly by judge Jackson. In the third whisky trust
proceeding, In re Greene,'° the crux of his opinion was that monopoly, as de-
fined by the common law and by the statute (Coke and Blackstone serving as
authorities on the former and Senators Edmunds and Hoar on the latter), con-
sisted of two necessary elements: an exclusive right enjoyed by the monopolist,
and restrictions imposed on others to prevent them from infringing on his
privilege. Under this definition of "monopoly," the whisky trust would not
monopolize even if it raised its output from three-quarters of the total liquor
sold to the whole-unless in the process it restrained others. But the indict-
ment, Jackson continued, did not allege any particular instances in which
the trust had tried to curtail others in producing or selling. The rebate offered
to dealers who would deal exclusively with the trust was not a restraint but
an inducement; it did not bind the dealers, and there was nothing to prevent
other producers from offering the same or greater rebates."' Even if the offer
were construed as a contract, it would not be a contract in general restraint
of trade, of the sort judged unlawful by common-law courts, but rather a
partial restraint. As such, it would be valid if it were reasonable, that is, if
the restraint was not "more injurious to the public than is required to afford
a fair protection to the party in whose favor it is secured.' 12
To support his view that the rebate agreement gave the trust only "a reason-
able protection in their business," Jackson now turned to a number of common-
law authorities, above all the recent English decision in the Mogul Steamship
9. In re Terrell, 51 Fed. 213 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1892).
10. 52 Fed. 104 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1892).
11. But see note 16 infra.
12. 52 Fed. at 118.
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case. 3 There, an association of shipowners had offered to give merchants in
China a rebate at the end of six months if during that time they exported tea
only on ships belonging to members of the association. The Mogul Steamship
Company, which did not participate in the association, had maintained that
its business was injured by the exclusive dealing arrangement, but had lost
its suit for damages. This struck Jackson as a conclusive precedent. Although
the rebate system was no doubt similar in the two cases, Jackson was neverthe-
less mistaken when he said that in the Mogul case "the question (almost
identical with that under consideration) was presented whether the combina-
tion and arrangement adopted by the association to secure the exclusive trans-
portation of tea trade was in any way unlawful."'14 The question in the English
decision was really a different one-not whether the agreement was "in any
way unlawful," but, specifically, whether it did unlawful damage to the plain-
tiff; and, although the House of Lords denied that the association had unlaw-
fully injured the plaintiff, it had no doubt that a common-law court would
regard the association as illegal in itself and would refuse to enforce the agree-
ment as between the parties. In the whisky trust case, on the other hand, the
pertinent question was whether the defendants had violated a statute that made
criminal offenses out of actions merely void at common law; and the Mogul
decision-bearing only on the damage issue-did not assert that the combi-
nation was valid. Moreover, even if the similarity of the two cases had been
as close as Jackson thought, the Mogul case was not an altogether convincing
precedent for an American court. It had been decided two years after the
Sherman Act was passed and, as a federal judge observed in an opinion de-
livered a few months later, the English common law on monopolies had for
some years been drifting toward greater leniency while "in the United States
there is a tendency to revive, with the aid of legislation, the strict rules of the
common law against all forms of monopoly or engrossing."'15 And finally, it is
uncertain that the rebate arrangement was so innocuous as the Mogul decision
and Jackson maintained.1 6
13. Mogul S.S. Co. v. McGregor, Gow & Co., [1892] A.C. 25 (1891).
14. 52 Fed. at 119.
15. Oliver v. Gilmore, 52 Fed. 562, 566 (C.C.D. Mass. 1892) (Putnam, J.).
16. The rebate in both cases was available only to those who during some long
period did all their business with one supplier. Now if a buyer has the choice of taking
an equal rebate from any one of several sellers, he will regard the choice as indifferent
only if each seller is equally able to supply goods whenever they are demanded. In the
circumstances of the Mogul case this condition probably did not prevail, for at any
moment the combine could send many more ships to the tea ports than the independent
line could muster; and, consequently, the probability that an exporter would regularly get
shipping space just when he needed it was greater if he dealt with the combine. If the
exporter had to wait for space, he would incur storage charges or losses, which would
to that extent reduce the value of a rebate. Similarly, in the whisky case, if the retailer
could not be supplied as quickly or as regularly by the independent distillers as he could
by the trust, the value to him of an independent's rebate-even if the independent offered
the same percentage as the trust-would always be less than the value of the trust rebate,
since the independent's rebate would have to be discounted for the possibility of lost sales
[Vol. 69:M0
FIRST DECADE OF THE SHERMAN ACT
In arriving at his decision, Jackson rejected the main point of the Govern-
ment's pleadings, which was that the trust violated the act by its mere existence,
for, though in form a single corporation, it was in fact a combination to set
prices and regulate the output of what had once been seventy competing firms.
He conceded that the arrangement might evidence an intent to monopolize,
but the intent itself-even if accompanied by actual pre-eminence in the industry
as well as by any incidental power that the trust might derive from its great
size-was not illegal, and would only become so if the trust tried to realize
the intent by, for instance, imposing restraints on others. Supplementing this
fundamental argument, he suggested a constitutional consideration, that the
federal government could not regulate the property of a corporation created
by a state.17 He contended also that, since the trust was formed before the act
was passed, to construe its formation as illegal would be to give the act an ex
post facto effect.' 8 (One might have thought, however, that to continue a
combination would be an illegal act even if to form it was not.)
Further Applications of Jackson's Rationale
Jackson's theory of the case reflected a widespread economic attitude of
optimistic confidence in the natural working of competition, and rested on the
belief that monopolies cannot maintain themselves simply by virtue of their
economic position. This reasoning assumes that a monopoly cannot drive out
competitors through such measures as price-cutting, exclusive dealing arrange-
ments, and price discrimination. He was convinced that independent producers
could as easily destroy a monopoly by using these techniques, for, he said,
nothing prevented the whisky trust's competitors from offering larger rebates.
If the state did not create or protect monopolies, and if it refused to enforce
the restrictive agreements by which monopolies seek to protect themselves,
enough competitors, actual or potential, would always be available to destroy
the monopoly or limit its power to set prices. This belief led him to interpret
the Sherman Act as an attempt to prohibit only those methods by which
monopolies could hope to survive in the face of competition and disposed him
to judge that, because it did not restrict its competitors, the whisky trust could
not be violating the act. Since Jackson's view was immediately accepted as
authoritative, it exercised a decisive influence for several years.
The Nelson Case
Indeed, in the next antitrust case, United States v. Nelson,'9 Jackson's
doctrine that there could be no monopolizing without restraining was carried
and extra storage charges. Jackson's argument that the independents could offer a larger
rebate than the trust paid does not meet the basic problem, since it merely suggests that
the independents could, if they chose, put themselves at the disadvantage of incurring
greater costs than the trust, and to that extent reduce their chances of surviving the
competition. [This analysis is based on suggestions by Professor Aaron Director.]
17. 52 Fed. at 112-13.
18. Id. at 112.
19. 52 Fed. 646 (D. Minn. 1892).
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to even greater lengths. In a short opinion, Judge Nelson sustained the demurrer
of a group of lumber merchants indicted for combining to raise prices, though
he said nothing more about the merits of the case than that the defendants
could not really raise the prices as they intended. He was convinced on gen-
eral principles that "competition is not stifled by such an agreement, and other
dealers would soon force the parties to the agreement to sell at the market price,
or a reasonable price, at least.' 20 This observation, as far as the judge was con-
cerned, disposed of any need to differentiate the case before him from contrary
common-law precedents or from the facts of the Jellico AMountain Coal case. He
simply overlooked the conflict between his view-that an attempt to raise prices
was not illegal if unsuccessful-and the opinion of Judge Key in the Jellico
decision-that the Sherman Act prohibited the attempt whether successful or
not. Moreover, although he was following Jackson, he did not see that the
facts in his case were different in one crucial respect from those in the whisky
trust proceedings. There, the combining firms had become the property of a
single corporation, and precedents provided a basis for deciding, as Jackson
did, that the parts of any single firm, no matter how large the whole, might
act in conceri without constituting a combination. In contrast, the Nelson
combination was made up of independent firms and, although their agreement
might not be restraining anyone else, it was unquestionably restraining them.
The Patterson Decision
The outlines of Jackson's doctrine were followed again-this time to the
detriment of the defendants-in a case heard shortly afterward, United States
v. Patterson.21 Judge Putnam, in upholding the major portion of an indictment
against officers of the cash register trust, seemed most impressed by the coercive
methods which the trust had used to restrain trade. It had attempted to intimi-
date its competitors by beating or bribing their employees, employing spies,
inducing breach of contract, threatening suits for patent infringement, and so
forth.22 The mere fact that the trust had come to control much of the cash
register business or even that it deliberately intended to control all of the
business did not in itself violate the act, but since, in addition, the trust had
used violence, it could be guilty of monopolizing. Violence, Putnam said, was
equivalent to restrictive legal arrangements, might indeed be used to impose
them on competitors, and was therefore an unlawful attempt to exclude com-
petition.
28
The Patterson decision illustrated the strength of Jackson's rationale. Those
who asserted that competition would automatically destroy pacific monopolies,
though probably correct in fact, were denying that the act should be used to
hasten the automatic decay or that Congress had intended it to be used for
20. Id. at 647.
21. 55 Fed. 605 (C.C.D. Mass. 1893).
22. Id. at 606.
23. Id. at 641.
[Vol. 68:900
FIRST DECADE OF THE SHERMAN ACT
that purpose. But as the Patterson decision showed, by adopting this posi-
tion, they were not rendering the act impotent. On the contrary, they insisted
that the act prohibited any attempt to impede the process of competition whether
by violent or contractual methods. This rule, as stated most fully by Jackson
and followed in most cases before 1893, directed the attention of judges to
overt acts, and thereby established a clear criterion of illegality. If it narrowed
the scope of the act, it defined that scope precisely. The criterion it established
-later expressed in the dictum, "size alone is not a violation of the act"-
slowly evolved into a principle that has since been used in interpreting antitrust
law: control of an industry is not unlawful even though it gives the defendant
power to do harm ; what the act prohibits is the abuse of that power by the actual
doing of harm.
The Trans-Missouri Case
Some judges went much further than Jackson and assumed not only that
enough competition would naturally exist to counteract monopolies, but that in
some industries there might at times be too much competition. And, while
Jackson believed that the common law did not invalidate peaceful combinations,
and that the law in general need not, these other judges believed that the law
positively endorsed combinations whose sole purpose was to do away with ex-
cessive competition. Their view was clearly demonstrated in the first two trials
of the Trans-Missouri Freight Association case.24 The defendants were a number
of railroads which had joined together to fix uniform rates and terms for freight
carriage. They had established a scheme whereby an association member could
deviate from the established rates only by following an elaborate, time-consum-
ing procedure, obviously designed to make him keenly aware of his colleagues'
displeasure. This arrangement, said District Judge Riner (who decided the
case on its first hearing), contained not a "single element of monopoly" because
the defendants had no exclusive right to carry freight by rail.2 5 On the other
hand, the agreement was certainly a contract in restraint of trade. But an ex-
tensive review of the precedents convinced Riner that such contracts were void
only if the restrictions they imposed were unnecessarily broad and "publicly
oppressive."2 6 In other words, the common law did not aim to preserve competi-
tion as such but only a desirable amount of competition. "Undoubtedly all
contracts which have a direct tendency to prevent healthy competition are
detrimental to the public, and, therefore, to be condemned; but when contracts
go to the extent only of preventing unhealthy competition, and yet at the same
time furnish the public with adequate facilities at fixed and reasonable prices,
and are made only for the purpose of averting personal ruin, the contract is
lawful."'27 The difficulty of determining whether the public enjoyed "adequate
24. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 53 Fed. 440 (C.C.D. Kan. 1892),
aff'd, 58 Fed. 58 (8th Cir. 1893), rev'd, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
25. 53 Fed. at 452-53.
26. Id. at 451.
27. Ibid.
1959]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
facilities" at "reasonable prices" did not arise, for the framing of the issue on the
pleadings required Riner to assume the truth of the defendants' assertions, and
they had said that the combination was formed in order to maintain "just and
reasonable rates." 28 He concluded that the restraint was reasonable, and that
it benefited the public by eliminating excessive competition among the railroads
and thus contributing to their prosperity.
This opinion might seem to have depended on an appraisal of economic order
very different from Jackson's, and it did for the first time introduce into anti-
trust law a precedent expressing some doubt as to the unlimited merits of com-
petition. Yet, in a broader sense, Riner and Jackson were at one, for each felt
that a judge obliged by statute to follow the common law might approve an
arrangement whose effect, or at least immediate effect, was to reduce competi-
tion. No doubt, there was authority in common-law cases for Riner's decision,
since courts had often indicated that they would approve railroad pools de-
signed to eliminate "ruinous" competition.29 There could be no doubt, moreover,
that Riner based his decision in part on the fact that the contracting parties
were railroads, for, in closing his opinion, he held that the Sherman Act did not
apply to these defendants in any event because they were already regulated
by the Interstate Commerce Act.8 0
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, which reviewed the Trans-Missouri
case a year later, affirmed on substantially the same principles. 31 The appellate
court held that, as the defendants were not joined in a monopoly of necessities
or a pool, their association was not prima facie illegal. It was a combination,
and as such was lawful or unlawful by common-law criteria, depending on
whether it merely "regulated" or actually "suppressed" competition, that is, on
whether it was "reasonable. '8 2 Moreover, another standard reinforced the com-
mon-law conclusion. Conceding that the Association "checked" competition
among the member railroads and had been formed for this sole purpose, the court
went on to maintain that Congress, in passing the Interstate Commerce Act, had
itself adopted the policy of reducing competition among railroads, and that rail-
roads which did for themselves what the law proposed to do for them could
not be convicted of acting contrary to public policy. 3 The only question left
to decide was whether the defendants had gone too far in executing a plan that
28. Ibid.
29. Manchester & L.R.R. v. Concord R.R., 66 N.H. 100, 20 At. 383 (1890); see
Chicago, St. L. & N.O.R.R. v. Pullman So. Car Co., 139 U.S. 79 (1891); Wiggins Ferry
Co. v. Chicago & A.R.R., 73 Mo. 389 (1881); Dewey, The Common-Law Background of
Antitrust Policy, 41 VA. L. REv. 759, 782-83 (1955), and cases cited therein.
30. 52 Fed. at 454-56. Section 407 of the Transportation Act of 1920, amending §
5(8) of the Interstate Commerce Act, expressly exempted railroads from the antitrust
laws. 41 Stat. 456, 482 (1920), as amended, 62 Stat. 472, 473 (1948), 49 U.S.C. § 5b(9)
(1952).
31. United States v. Trans-Missour! Freight Ass'n, 58 Fed. 58 (8th Cir. 1893), rcv'd,
166 U.S. 290 (1897).
32. 58 Fed. at 69, 73.
33. Id. at 74-77.
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was unexceptionable in itself. On examining the agreement, the court de-
termined that it would not necessarily or probably "suppress" competition.
Nor did the evidence establish that the defendants had in fact charged un-
reasonable rates. The court accordingly upheld Judge Riner's opinion that
a railroad combination was reasonable and legal if it charged "reasonable"
prices.
In 1896, when District Judge Wheeler dismissed a bill brought against a
similar arrangement in the Joint Traffic Association case, 34 he too set forth as
the ultimate test of a railroad combination's legality whether it charged "reason-
able" prices.
The effect of these very early antitrust decisions, then, was to establish the
doctrine that the Sherman Act should be interpreted according to the common
law, and the common-law rule most often invoked was that combinations
were illegal only if they restrained trade unreasonably, that is, by using re-
strictive agreements or physical coercion, or by excessively raising prices.
THE BROADER INTERPRETATION OF THE ACT IN THE LABOR UNION CASES
The judges who heard early labor cases arising under the Sherman Act
could not so easily find a common-law tradition to guide them. It was clear,
despite wbat the common-law rules had once been, that, since early in the nine-
teenth century, the cases had ceased to classify unions as unlawful combinations
in themselves. And, after the decision of Commonwealth v. Hunt in 1842, 35
strikes were no longer regarded as illegal, provided they were intended to force
the strikers' own employer to raise wages and were conducted peaceably. The
mere establishment of unions and the organizing of an uneventful strike there-
fore appeared permissible under the Sherman Act if common-law rules were
to be followed. The status of other union activities was more doubtful.
The First Labor Antitrust Case
The nature of the problem became apparent in the first antitrust case involv-
ing a union, United States v. Workingmen's Anwigamated Council.36 The de-
fendants were conducting a general strike in New Orleans. The Government
sought to end it, and District Judge Billings issued a temporary injunction on
the ground that the strike violated the act. While conceding that Congress had
been moved to enact the antitrust laws by "the evils of massed capital," he
nevertheless held that, in the course of debate, "the subject had so broadened
in the minds of the legislators" that they had decided to interdict "every con-
tract or combination in the form of trust, or otherwise in restraint of trade
or commerce," whether organized by businessmen or by laborers.37 Was this
34. United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 76 Fed. 895 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1896), aff'd men.,
89 Fed. 1020 (2d Cir. 1897), rev'd, 171 U.S. 505 (1898).
35. 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 111 (1842).
36. 54 Fed. 994 (C.C.E.D. La.), aff'd, 57 Fed. 85 (5th Cir. 1893).
37. 54 Fed. at 996.
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strike illicitly "in restraint of trade"? Billings conceded that unions as such
were lawful and, in effect, accepted the defendants' argument that ordinary
strikes were lawful as well.3s And he did not maintain that the Council's
strike would be illegal at common law, though he did point out, in sumnariz-
ing the evidence, that the strikers had practiced violence and intimidation.3"
Therefore, in order to show that the strike violated the Sherman Act, Billings
had to conclude that, despite the common law, it was a "combination . . .in
restraint of trade." The only authority he offered was a somewhat remote New
York precedent, People v. Fisher.4° Decided in 1835, it was one of the last
to forbid an ordinary strike involving no violence. Moreover, the particular
remark quoted by Billings as authoritative was obiter dictum. Chief Justice
Savage of New York had written that certain strikes, including general strikes,
"would be productive of derangement and confusion, which certainly must be
considered 'injurious to trade'. '4 1 The justice wrote "would be" rather than
"are" because his remark was an afterthought that did not concern the events
of his case, a peaceful strike of shoemakers. Finally, even this aged dictum
was not very suitable for Billings' purposes. The quotation marks that had
surrounded "injurious to trade" when Savage used the words, and that vanished
when Billings repeated them, 42 were no mere affectation, for the words occurred
in the New York statute invoked in People v. Fisher, a statute that outlawed
conspiracies "injurious to trade. ' 43 But Billings quietly overlooked all these
defects in his precedent and reasoned that, since a general strike had once
been said to "injure" trade, it must now be judged to "restrain" trade. For-
getting also that the words "restraint of trade" in the Sherman Act were
intended to be given their common-law, rather than their literal, meaning,
he was able to deduce that the New Orleans general strike violated the act.
It would not, perhaps, have been much more difficult to reason that a gang
of train-robbers would violate the antitrust statute, for they too would be a
combination and would "restrain trade" if they halted a train.
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit soon affirmed or appeared
to affirm Billings' decision.44 In fact, the court upheld only the technical pro-
priety of the proceedings and said little about the substance of the opinion, since
the lower court had not yet concluded its hearings: "On this appeal from an inter-
locutory order, which we affirm, we deem it unnecessary to anticipate the further
progress and final hearing of this case by an expression of our views as to the full
scope and sound construction of this recent and important statute."4 But the
lower court never held final hearings, and the original decision stood as the
38. Id. at 999.
39. Id. at 1000.
40. 14 Wend. 9 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jud. 1835).
41. Id. at 19.
42. 54 Fed. at 1000.
43. 14 Wend. at 14.
44. Workingmen's Amalgamated Council v. United States, 57 Fed. 85 (5th Cir. 1893).
45. Id. at 86.
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only substantial precedent in the field when the Pullman strike cases came
before the courts a year later. The judges in those cases relied on Billings'
opinion and regarded the decision of the court of appeals as greatly enhancing
its authority.
46
The Pullman Strike Litigation
The Debs Case
The most important labor antitrust case during this period, United States
v. Debs,47 began when the leaders of the American Railway Union disobeyed
injunctions ordering them to cease conducting the Pullman strike. Their at-
torneys responded to the contempt proceedings that followed by questioning
the jurisdiction of the courts, the validity of the injunctions, the assertion that
they had been disobeyed, and so on. Although none of these arguments per-
suaded Judge Woods, who heard the case in the circuit court at Chicago, two
of them seemed to impress him. The first raised the same question that had
been the chief problem for Judge Billings in the Workingmen's Council case.
How, Debs' attorneys asked, could the union be said to have violated the
Sherman Act? It was not a "combination in restraint of trade"; and even
supposing that its activities had injured or restrained trade, there was a vast
legal difference between injuring or restraining trade and being "in restraint
of trade." Woods' resolution of this difficulty, more sophisticated and complex
than Billings', rested on a novel reading of the statute. The first section of the
act, as Judge Woods interpreted it, defined three distinct categories: contracts
in restraint of trade, combinations in restraint of trade, and conspiracies. The
distinctness of the three or, more particularly, of the third in relation to the
first two, was emphasized by the act's title, which stated that the act was de-
signed to prohibit "unlawful" contracts and combinations in restraint of trade
-the sort that had been considered illicit at common law. But the qualifica-
tion implicit in the title obviously did not attach to conspiracies, which are
by definition unlawful. The question then arose, what sort of conspiracies
did the Sherman Act forbid? Not "conspirac[ies] . . . in restraint of trade,"
for no such category was known at common law; nor, Woods insisted, only
those conspiracies involving contracts or combinations in restraint of trade.48
The answer was to be found by interpreting the phrase "conspiracy . . . in
restraint of trade or commerce" as equivalent to "conspiracy to restrain trade
or commerce." Since "conspiracy ... in restraint of trade" did not, to be sure,
have a well-established meaning at common law, the Woods construction did
46. See, e.g., United States v. Cassidy, 67 Fed. 698, 705 (N.D. Cal. 1895) (charge to
jury) ; United States v. Elliot, 62 Fed. 801, 803 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1894) ; In re Grand Jury,
62 Fed. 840, 841 (N.D. Cal. 1894) (charge); Thomas v. Cincinnati, N.O. & T. P. Ry.,
62 Fed. 803, 821 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1894).
47. 64 Fed. 724 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1894).
48. Id. at 748. There are, contrary to Woods' assertion, several common-law cases of
conspiracy in restraint of trade. See Letwin, The English Common Law Concerning
Monopolies, 21 U. CHI. L. Rzv. 355, 381 (1954).
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not stretch the language of the act as radically as had Billings' manipulation of
"combination . . . in restraint of trade." Woods argued that "to restrain"
was not more different from "in restraint of" than "drinking house" was from
"tippling house," and that courts had in the past treated the latter two as
synonymous. This much established, the course of his argument required him
next to insist that "trade" and "commerce" were not synonyms. He had no
difficulty in establishing that "commerce" as used in the Sherman Act meant
"commerce" as used in the Constitution to define the regulatory power of
Congress. And this completed the foundations of the principle he now an-
nounced: the Sherman Act prohibited conspiracies to injure or restrain inter-
state commerce.
49
Having proceeded so far by reasoning from the language of the act, Woods
now turned to its policy. He observed that various decisions had narrowed
the scope of the statute until it apparently applied only to commodities in the
course of transportation among the states, or to agreements "intended to en-
gross or monopolize the market." He concluded that the act should be broad-
ened by his interpretation. "Why should it not be construed to embrace all
conspiracies which shall be contrived with intent, or of which the necessary
or probable effect shall be, to restrain, hinder, interrupt, or destroy interstate
commerce?"5 ° By this process, Woods tried to reinforce Billings' test; but
he apparently recognized the extreme weakness of the Workingmen's Council
decision, for, although he cited it as one of the precedents establishing that a
court of equity had jurisdiction over such cases, he did not mention it as an
authority for his interpretation of the substance of the law.r'
It still remained for Woods to dispose of another argument which the Debs
attorneys advanced-perhaps to exploit a gap in Billings' opinion. They
insisted that many conspiracies, even though they interfered with interstate
commerce, could not reasonably be supposed to violate the Sherman Act. Tak-
ing as their text the argument advanced by the defendants in United States v.
Patterson, Debs' counsel maintained that, if the act were interpreted as pro-
hibiting any interference with interstate commerce, it would have to be applied
-- contrary to its obvious purpose-to any conspiracy to commit "an act of
murder, robbery, forgery, shop-breaking, store-burning, champerty, or mainte-
nance, which in fact has a natural, though unintended, result of interference with
interstate commerce." 52 Woods dismissed this assertion by denying that mem-
bers of a conspiracy to murder could be considered members of a conspiracy
to restrain interstate commerce, if the restraint were an unintended consequence
49. 64 Fed. at 747-52.
50. Id. at 752.
51. Id. at 754.
52. Id. at 752. The words as they appear in text apparently are quoted by the court
from the brief for Debs; they correspond only roughly with the words used in the brief for
Patterson, United States v. Patterson, 55 Fed. 605, 632 (C.C.D. Mass. 1893). For example
they do not explicitly say, as Patterson's attorney did, that in view of the decisions that
would otherwise result, the act must be interpreted as requiring a specific intent to inter-
fere with interstate commerce.
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of the murder. They would, he stated, be responsible for the murder as con-
spirators and for the incidental restraint as individuals 3 This principle,
though it answered the defendants' objection, might have created new difficul-
ties for Woods, since it obliged him to show that the defendants had interfered
with interstate commerce directly and not merely incidentally. This problem
he overcame by holding that Pullman cars were "instrumentalities of com-
merce," that Debs and his colleagues engaged in a conspiracy to interfere with
commerce when they ordered the boycott, and that they became liable as indi-
viduals for the criminal results that ensued. Moreover, when they sought to
enforce the boycott by calling a strike against railroads that continued to
carry Pullman cars, "the original conspiracy against the use of Pullman cars
became a conspiracy against transportation and travel by railroad."54
The Debs Decision as a Precedent in Subsequent Pullman Strike Proceedings
The theory devised by Billings and reinforced by Woods became the basis
of decisions in other cases arising out of the Pullman strike. In United States
v. Elliott, a circuit court in Missouri issued a preliminary injunction against
officers of the union and used Billings' decision as authority for its interpre-
tation of the Sherman Act.r5 A few weeks later, in overruling the defendants'
demurrer in that same case, Judge Philips explained that, in the Sherman
Act, "the term 'restraint of commerce' was used in its ordinary, business under-
standing and acceptation"; he proceeded to give a literal definition of "re-
straint," and concluded that it justified the injunction. 0 In Thonms v. Cin-
cinnati, N.O. & T.P. Ry.,17 a private suit turning on whether a strike leader
had unlawfully interfered with a receiver appointed by the court to administer
the railroad, Judge William Howard Taft held the interference unlawful on
several grounds. Although he seemed to regard the Sherman Act violation
as the least important of these grounds, he did not hesitate to cite the Work-
ingien's Council decision in support of his holding or to allude to the fact
that a number of judges had followed Billings' decision in enjoining the Pull-
man strike.,5 Again, Judge Morrow, in his charge to a grand jury investi-
gating the strikers' activities in California, cited Billings' decision which, he
said, established the principle that a strike accompanied by violence and in-
timidation was proscribed by the Sherman Act. Morrow stressed, moreover,
that the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals had affirmed this view.59 Later, when
a number of strikers were tried, Morrow instructed the jury by again referring
to the Billings opinion, now further reinforced by Woods' decision in the Debs
case.
60
53. 64 Fed. at 752-53.
54. Id. at 765.
55. 62 Fed. 801, 803 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1894).
56. United States v. Elliott, 64 Fed. 27, 30 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1894).
57. 62 Fed. 803 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1894).
58. Id. at 821-22.
59. In re Grand Jury, 62 Fed. 840, 841-42 (N.D. Cal. 1894).
60. United States v. Cassidy, 67 Fed. 698, 705 (N.D. Cal. 1895).
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When the Debs case came before it, the Supreme Court neither endorsed
nor rejected the Billings-Woods-Morrow theory of the Sherman Act. The Court
based its decision instead on an argument advanced by Attorney General Olney
-that the Government did not need to invoke the Sherman Act, since it had
common-law authority to obtain injunctions against disturbances amounting
to a public nuisance. The Court said nothing about Woods' interpretation of
the act except that its silence was not to be taken to mean disagreement. 1'
Woods' literal reading of the statute therefore continued to stand as precedent
for a method of interpretation that extended the scope of the act.
JURISDICTIONAL PROBLEMS AND THE KNIGHT CASE
Though many congressmen had feared that the weakest point in the act
would be its constitutional basis, and though its opponents had constantly
urged that it was certainly unconstitutional, no court had been forced to face
this issue before 1895. As yet, no judge had failed to find that the defendants
before him were engaged in interstate commerce and acting so as to affect it.
The mine owners in the Jellico case had traded with dealers in another state;
the whisky trust had supplied out-of-state merchants; the railroads in the
Trans-Missouri and Joint Traffic cases were unquestionably engaged in inter-
state commerce; and Debs could not deny that he had conducted a strike
against interstate carriers. To be sure, in the Greene case Judge Jackson had
asserted that the federal goverment lacked power to interfere with the lawful
use of property by citizens of the states and corporations created by a state,
2
and he had expressed some doubt as to the interstate character of the sales
recounted by the indictment,63 but these views were not essential to his de-
cision.
The sugar trust case, United States v. E. C. Knight Co.,64 was the first to
turn on the question of interstate commerce. The Government's attorneys
had not foreseen the difficulty-understandably, since none of the previous
decisions warned them. They confidently asserted that, in buying up four of
its five remaining competitors, the trust had combined and conspired with the
erstwhile competitors to restrain and monopolize interstate commerce. Evi-
dently, the federal attorneys never imagined that any question could arise as
to whether the trust engaged in interstate commerce. But the strategy adopted
by the Government unfortunately emphasized the very aspect of the trust's
activities that was not "commercial" in the constitutional sense. The chief
remedy sought was cancellation of the contracts by which the trust had acquired
its competitors' plants, a solution reasonable enough in the circumstances,
particularly since sound reasons existed for preferring a suit in equity to a
61. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 600 (1895).
62. In re Greene, 52 Fed. 104, 112-13 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1892).
63. Id. at 117.
64. 60 Fed. 306 (C.C.E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 60 Fed. 934 (3d Cir. 1894), aff'd, 156 U.S. 1
(1895).
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criminal indictment. 65 Nevertheless, the proposed remedy called attention to
the trust's manufacturing activities, which necessarily went on within states
rather than among states. Perhaps still more inauspicious, as it happened,
was the fact that all four of the purchased plants were located in the same
state and, indeed, in the same city, Philadelphia. District Judge Butler seized
on this as the central fact that disposed of the entire issue. "The contracts
and acts of the defendants," he held, "relate exclusively to the acquisition of
sugar refineries and the business of sugar refining, in Pennsylvania. They have
no reference and bear no relation to commerce between the states or with
foreign nations."6 6 It followed that the acts could not be prohibited by a federal
statute.
In the chief lines of his argument, Butler followed Judge Jackson's reason-
ing in the Greene case, but without fully understanding it. The essential ques-
tion, Butler said, had been "fully considered" by Jackson ("now of the Supreme
Court") in an opinion that was "clear and satisfactory."6' 7 Despite its clarity,
however, Butler did not quite appreciate its implications. He maintained that
the sugar trust's monopoly of manufacture did not give it a monopoly of com-
merce because commerce was "untouched, unrestrained and open to all who
choose to engage in it."68 This was certainly Jackson's test of monopoly, but
Jackson would not have made the initial concession that the trust had a
monopoly of manufacture; for he would have found that the trust had done
nothing to close manufacturing to any who might "choose to engage in it."
Oddly enough, Butler did take the trouble of listing among the material facts
proved by evidence "that the contract of sale in each instance left the sellers
free to establish other refineries and continue the business if they should see
fit to do so." ° Clearly, if he was using Jackson's criterion of monopoly, then
this fact established that the trust had no monopoly of manufacturing; and, if
he was not using Jackson's criterion, the fact was immaterial. Butler moved
to more solid ground when he considered whether the trust had a secondary
monopoly of commerce. He maintained that, even if it had one, the trust re-
strained commerce only incidentally and therefore did not violate the act, which
could only prohibit "direct" interference with commerce. 70 The Third Circuit
Court of Appeals upheld Butler's decision and emphasized the core of the
argument by insisting that "the questioned conduct of the defendants"--that
is, the contracts to purchase competitors' plants--did not concern interstate com-
merce.
71
65. The whisky trust defendants had complained that criminal action was, in effect,
persecution, and District Judge, Ricks, in one of the whisky trust cases, had suggested
that the courts would be more receptive to civil suits, In re Corning, 51 Fed. 205, 212-13
(N.D. Ohio 1892). In any event, the settled rules of interpretation required courts to
construe a criminal statute narrowly.
66. 60 Fed. at 309.
67. Id. at 310.
68. Id. at 309.
69. Id. at 307.
70. Id. at 309-10.
71. United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 60 Fed. 934 (3d Cir. 1894).
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The Government's appeal in the Knight case was decided by the Supreme
Court early in 1895,72 a few months before the opinion in the Debs case was
handed down. Chief Justice Fuller, in affirming the decisions of the lower
courts, at the same time further clarified the central problem and disposed of
the collateral issues. He began his opinion by insisting that the suit turned
solely on whether the contracts to buy up competitors were valid. He then
briefly dismissed each of the other questions raised by the parties and by
Butler's opinion. It did not matter, he said, whether monopoly meant only a
privilege granted by the state or a power acquired by the private efforts of
individuals. It did not matter whether the case involved a combination, or
whether Butler was correct in thinking that no combination could be shown
here because the trust had made a separate bargain with each of the four
competitors. Nor was it significant, as Butler thought, that the trust lowered
the price of sugar, for low prices did not relieve "the objection to concentra-
tion of power." Finally-and most important in view of Butler's treatment
of the case-it made no difference that the contracts were not in restraint of
trade, though the Chief Justice obviously did not believe that the absence of
restraint could be deduced from the fact that "others were theoretically left
free to go into the business of refining sugar, and the original stockholders of
the Philadelphia refineries after becoming stockholders of the American Com-
pany might go into competition with themselves, or, parting with that stock,
might set up again for themselves.
'7 3
From the way Fuller disposed of the implications of Butler's "material
facts," it is clear that he did not accept Jackson's theory that competition
would inevitably destroy the trusts. His reference to "concentration of power,"
his sarcastic treatment of the possibility of new competitors entering or old
competitors re-entering the industry, his refusal to distinguish between a
monopoly in fact and a monopoly at law-all these indicate a sharp disapproval
of the sugar trust's position and practices. Nevertheless, he insisted that the
fundamental legal question was "whether conceding that the existence of a
monopoly in manufacture is established by the evidence, that monopoly can be
directly suppressed under the Act of Congress in the mode attempted by this
bill."' 74 This way of putting the case stressed the two parts of the question:
first, whether the Sherman Act could destroy a monopoly of manufacture, and,
second, whether the attempt to dissolve the contracts involved in this case was
an appropriate way to invoke this act against these defendants. Fuller answered
the first half of the question by holding that the monopoly of manufacture only
"incidentally and indirectly" affected commerce and that it therefore was not
amenable to federal statutes based on the commerce clause.7' The second part
he answered by suggesting that, had the Government concentrated its attack
on the trust's commercial activities, the decision would have gone differently.
72. United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
73. Id. at 9-11.
74. Id. at 11.
75. Id. at 12.
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To assail the trust for acquiring manufacturing plants was inevitably to make
the trust's commercial activities appear secondary; but if its commercial activi-
ties had been emphasized in the bill, no constitutional question could have
arisen. This suggestion appears in his first summary of the case as well as in
his closing remark that "there was nothing in the proofs to indicate any inten-
tion to put a restraint upon trade or commerce, and the fact, as we have seen,
that trade or commerce might be indirectly affected was not enough to entitle
complainants to a decree."
76
Many other signs in Fuller's opinion suggest that, but for this defect in
the Government's strategy, the Court would have decided in its favor. In
discussing what Butler called the material facts of the case, Fuller implied that
the trust really had imposed restraints on other parties, albeit hidden re-
straints, so that, even under Jackson's doctrine, they might have been con-
demned. But the Court was apparently ready to go further than Jackson in
presuming that a monopoly was illegal. "[A]l1 the authorities agree," Fuller
wrote, "that in order to vitiate a contract or combination it is not essential
that its result should be a complete monopoly; it is sufficient if it really tends
to that end and to deprive the public of the advantages which flow from free
competition. ' 77 Significantly, Fuller's opinion did not approve or even mention
Jackson's opinion in the Greene case. The Chief Justice's attitude throughout
shows that the decision of the Court depended strictly on the facts of the
case. It did not lay down the rule, often ascribed to the Knight decision, that
manufacturers as such are immune from the Sherman Act, but rather held
that manufacturing was immune, and therefore that manufacturers were sub-
ject to the act only in so far as their activities constituted interstate commerce
or directly affected it.
Justice Harlan's dissent in the Knight case, although it denied at each critical
point the conclusions of the majority, really rested on the assumption that the
Court had authority to treat the case in a broader fashion than that proposed
by the Government. Along with its prayer for a decree annulling the contracts
of sale (and in the traditional style of bills in equity), the Government had
prayed for such other relief as the Court might see fit to grant. Fuller had
answered that the Court would not heed the more general prayer unless it
found cause to grant the specific and principal remedy requested. Harlan, on
the other hand, insisted that the general remedy could be provided even though
the specific one was not. 78 If one assumed, as Harlan did, that the case ought
to be viewed as an attack on the sugar trust as such, rather than on the four
contracts alone, the rest of Harlan's position would have been difficult to
dispute. He pointed out that the sugar trust had been organized not only to
manufacture sugar but also to sell it; he could quote from the district court's
summary of the facts the finding that the sugar trust had bought up its com-
petitors in order to perfect its "control over the business of refining and selling
76. Id. at 17.
77. Id. at 16.
78. Id. at 45-46.
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sugar in this country" ;70 and he could insist with obvious accuracy that every-
one knew the trust sold sugar throughout the country. Moreover, it was not
difficult for him to show that previous decisions of the Supreme Court had
held selling to be a part of commerce-indeed, the majority opinion in
this very case conceded the point. The way was thus open to conclude that
the trust, by its mere existence, had the power to control the sale of sugar-
that is, to control part of interstate commerce-in a way forbidden by the
Sherman Act. In this view of the case, the contracts to purchase the com-
petitors were important not because they themselves violated the act but be-
cause they showed that the trust violated the act. In this manner, Harlan
showed that the Court could and should have transformed the weak case
brought by the Government against the contracts of sale into an overpowering
case against the trust. Had it done so, the whole constitutional question
would have disappeared. Fuller does not seem to have disagreed on this point,
but he maintained, with the majority, that it was not for the Court to improve
the strategy that the Government had chosen.
LITERAL INTERPRETATION vs. THE RULE OF REASON: THE TRANS-MISSOURI
DECISION
The view that the act was more than a codification of the common law,
foreshadowed in the Debs and E. C. Knight decisions, achieved full expression
when, in 1897, the Supreme Court reversed the lower courts in the Trans-
Missouri Freight Association case.8 0 Justice Peckham took the explicit posi-
tion that the Sherman Act went beyond the common law: whereas the latter
proscribed only unreasonable restraints, the act in so many words prohibited
every restraint. During the next six years, Peckham was the Court's chief
spokesman in antitrust cases, and the doctrine he announced generally prevailed.
In the Trans-Missouri case, once it was determined that the Sherman Act ap-
plied to railroads,8 the only question was whether the Freight Association
79. Id. at 18.
80. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
81. The pleadings of the Freight Association, endorsed by the decrees of the lower
courts, made it imperative that Peckham first dispose of a jurisdictional question-whether
the Sherman Act applied to railroads at all. The defendants had advanced a series of
arguments denying that it did, chief among them the one that had prevailed below-that
the Interstate Commerce Act, 24 Stat. 379 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1-27 (1952),
permitted associations like that before the Court. If the Sherman Act were presumed to
prohibit the Association, they maintained, it would be construed as implicitly repealing
the Interstate Commerce Act, which no one could suppose to be its purpose. Peckham,
however, saw the relation between the two statutes in quite another way. He held that,
although the Commerce Act did not prohibit such associations, neither did it authorize
them. The Sherman Act, which did prohibit them, was therefore not in conflict with the
Commerce Act, and both acts could consistently apply to railroads. United States v.
Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, supra note 80, at 314-16. Moreover, the Sherman Act's
very language indicated that the statute reached the railroads. "When the act prohibits
contracts in restraint of trade or commerce, the plain meaning of the language used
includes contracts which relate to either or both subjects." Id. at 325. This was another
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violated it. The answer depended, according to the defendants, on whether the
Association was illegal at common law, and they supported their view by point-
ing to the title of the act, which reads, "to protect trade and commerce against
inlawful restraints and monopolies."'8 2 But Peckham, speaking for the ma-
jority of the Court, maintained that the title did not refer to restraints and
monopolies that were illegal by common-law principles but to those that were
"made unlawful in the body of the statute."8 3 Contracts in restraint of trade,
Peckham reasoned, were a familiar category at common law, and had come to
be divided into two classes. "Some of such contracts have been held void and
unenforceable in the courts by reason of their restraint being unreasonable,
while others have been held valid because they were not of that nature. A
contract may be in restraint of trade and still be valid at common law." But
the Sherman Act had erased this distinction.
When, therefore, the body of an act pronounces as illegal every contract
or combination in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, etc., the plain and ordinary meaning of such language is not
limited to that kind of contract which is in unreasonable restraint of trade,
but all contracts are included in such language, and no exception or
limitation can be added without placing in the act that which has been
omitted by Congress.
8 4
Although the "plain language" of the act decided the issue at trial as far as
he was concerned, Peckham went on to discuss the hypothetical question of
whether the Association would have violated the act had the statutory prohi-
bitions been construed as being no broader than those at the common law. The
common law, he asserted, had come to tolerate contracts that included a re-
straint of trade collateral to the sale of a business-the sort of arrangement by
which the seller of a shop might agree not to open a competing business in the
same neighborhood. And then, surprisingly, Peckham added that such contracts
"might not be included, within the letter or spirit of the statute."8 5 His next
sentence explained this apparent contradiction by implying that judges may
carve exceptions from the letter of the law in order to bring its effect closer to
the legislators' intent. But Peckham, unlike some other judges, would not
go so far as to assert that all reasonable restraints should be excepted on the
same principle.
He turned now to the merits of the arguments by which the defendants tried
to show that the Association constituted a reasonable restraint and was formed
way of saying what Woods had said in the Debs case: since the act, read literally, pro-
hibited arrangements in restraint of interstate commerce, a restrictive agreement among
interstate railways would certainly be within its scope. Adopting another argument ad-
vanced by Woods, Peckham maintained, moreover, that inasmuch as the Knight decision
excluded manufacturing from the scope of the act, to exclude railroads as well "would
leave little for the act to take effect upon." Id. at 313, 326.
82. Emphasis added.
83. Id. at 327.
84. Id. at 328.
85. Id. at 329.
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to achieve purposes which Congress could not have meant to declare illegal.
They urged that competition among railroads is always excessive and, if un-
restrained, would lead to bankruptcy and ruin. A combination designed to
prevent this result by restricting excess competition and establishing reasonable
rates could not be supposed contrary to public policy. Peckham was inclined
to agree that railroads always stood in danger of ruinous competition,80 but
he rejoined that many commentators took the opposite view-that full competi-
tion not only benefited the public but, in the long run, did not injure the rail-
roads.8 7 Morever, he asserted, it would be impossible to determine whether
rates set by a combination were reasonable, and recognition of this difficulty
might well have prompted Congress to prohibit all agreements in restraint of
trade, whether reasonable or not.8 8 It might even be true, he conceded, that
the Association was valid at common law. The argument to the contrary was
"not entirely conclusive."8 9 But, in any event, Congress had refused to dis-
tinguish in the body of the act between reasonable and unreasonable restraints,
and the Court would decline "to read into the act by way of judicial legisla-
tion an exception that is not placed there by the law-making branch of the
Government."'9 Thus, every inquiry led Peckham back to the same essential
rule, that the act must be given its literal meaning.
Justice White's Dissent
Peckham's opinion called forth a strong dissent, written by Justice White,
which is memorable as the first statement of the doctrine later known as the
rule of reason. All of the majority's errors White summarized as "unreason-
able." The word runs like a refrain through his opinion. While the common
law invalidated only unreasonable restraints on trade, the present agreement
between the defendants was reasonable-so much, White said, was conceded
by the majority. 91 The contract, therefore, was reasonable according to the
common law, or, as White put it, according to "general principles of law."
But the act, as Peckham construed it, condemned the contract. In other words,
it condemned a reasonable contract. Therefore, White concluded, the act must
be unreasonable. If so, Congress was unreasonable in passing it, and the courts
could not avail themselves of reason in interpreting it.92 Having shown this
logical difficulty in Peckham's opinion, White moved on to an argument from
precedent. Was it true, as Peckham asserted, that the common law considered
any contract that restrained trade a "contract in restraint of trade"? Could a
86. Id. at 331, 340.
87. Id. at 338.
88. Id. at 331-32.
89. Id. at 335.
90. Id. at 340.
91. Id. at 343-44. This was a slight exaggeration; the majority conceded the point
about the common law, but merely assumed for the sake of argument that the agreement
was reasonable. Id. at 335.
92. Id. at 344.
[Vol. 68:900
FIRST DECADE OF THE SHERMAN ACT
"contract in restraint of trade," as Peckham asserted, be either valid or invalid
at common law? White answered no. He maintained that the term "contract
in restraint of trade" had always been reserved for illegal contracts and had
never been used, except in a loose and imprecise way, to describe permissible
agreements. Only those contracts that unreasonably restrained trade were
illegal and properly known as "contracts in restraint of trade." The source
of confusion, White explained, was that, originally, every contract which re-
strained trade had been interpreted by the courts as a "contract in restraint
of trade," that is, as an illegal contract. But, in time, more and more contracts
that restrained trade were judged by the courts to restrain it "reasonably,"
and these contracts were therefore excluded from the proscribed class of "con-
tracts in restraint of trade. '93 It followed that the Sherman Act, in prohibiting
"every contract in restraint of trade," did not prohibit every contract tending
to restrain trade but only those agreements which restrained it unreasonably
and which had been prohibited at common law as "contracts in restraint of
trade."
Having stated his chief objection to the majority's interpretation and pre-
sented his own view of the act, White added some reflections on the impolicy
of the majority position. For one thing, he pointed out, a rigorous application
of Peckham's rule would render illegal every contract in restraint of trade
which was collateral to a sale of property. Peckham was inconsistent in holding
first that "every" meant what it said and then that collateral restraints might be
permissible. But if "every" were taken as all-inclusive and "contract in re-
straint of trade" were regarded as describing any contract that in fact restrained
trade, then the act would prohibit trade-or at least that part of trade com-
prising sales of property to which restraining conditions were attached. The
result would be that a statute designed to free trade would, unreasonably, be
enforced so as to restrain it. Nor was this the most dire result he foresaw. By
denying the rule of reason and destroying the security afforded by the rule's
flexibility, Peckham's interpretation would subject liberty of contract and
freedom of trade "to the mere caprice of judicial authority." 94 He offered
little hope that the fabric of civil society could be preserved unless the courts
returned to the rule of reason and interpreted the Sherman Act as prohibiting
only unreasonable restraints of trade.
It may seem curious that the same case should have evoked these two ex-
treme principles of interpretation. The appearance of these divergent opinions
at this moment depended to some extent on the coincidence that Peckham
and White were members of the Court at the same time. But it also reflected
a more permanent division of ideas in the Court, a disagreement which had
probably existed before 1897 but had never before had occasion to be expressed.
Since the Knight decision had gone off on a constitutional issue and the Debs
case on general principles of common law and equity, the Trans-Missouri case
was the first in which the Supreme Court was called on to interpret the sub-
93. Id. at 346-52.
94. Id. at 355.
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stance of the act. The split might have been expected, because the ambiguity
of the act allowed interpretation to vary according to the diverse views that
Justices entertained about the meaning of the common law and its relation
to the statute. But, for the moment, and indeed for over a decade, the majority
of the Court preferred Peckham's approach to the rule of reason.
THE COMMON LAW RECONSmERED: TAFT'S ADDYSTON PIPE DECISION
Just at this moment, when the courts seemed to have settled on a literal in-
terpretation of the Sherman Act, a decision was rendered which suggested
a way to view the common law so as to give the act an almost identical inter-
pretation. This analysis appeared in the opinion that William Howard Taft,
then sitting on the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, wrote in the Addyston
Pipe case.95
The case had been heard by the trial court in 1897,96 just a month before
the Trans-Missouri decision, and had been decided-for the defendants-
according to the prevailing doctrines. It involved six cast-iron pipe manu-
facturers, producing between one-fifth and one-third of the nation's supply, 7
who had organized an association and a complex pooling system. When large
users of pipe, chiefly municipalities and utility companies, advertised for bids,
the association's executive committee would decide on the price to be asked
and would award the privilege of bidding to whichever of the six member
companies offered to pay the highest bonus into the association's treasury.
The firm winning the right to bid was "protected" by its fellow members, who,
for the sake of appearance, submitted bids slightly higher than its own. This
system, which prevailed on large, special orders, was augmented by the re-
quirement that members pay fixed bonuses on goods sold in the ordinary
course of business, as well as on all sales in "reserved cities"--places assigned
to each company as its exclusive market. Bonuses were not due, however, on
goods sold in "free territory," the twelve New England and Middle Atlantic
states where the association faced intense competition. Accumulated bonuses
were periodically distributed among the members according to predetermined
proportions. The Government contended and proved to the satisfaction of the
trial court that the purpose of the arrangement was to reduce competition
among the defendants and permit them to raise the price of pipe. The trial
court held, nevertheless, that the association had not violated the Sherman
Act.
The primary basis of the trial court's decision was that, since the defendants
were manufacturers who affected interstate commerce only indirectly, they
95. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175
U.S. 211 (1899), reversing 78 Fed. 712 (C.C.E.D. Tenn. 1897).
96. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 78 Fed. 712 (C.C.E.D. Tenn. 1897).
97. Id. at 714. The six firms had a total daily capacity of 650 tons, while two groups
of unassociated competitors had capacities of 835 and 1550 tons daily. According to Taft,
the Association had nearer one-third of the national capacity. United States v. Addyston
Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271, 277 (6th Cir. 1898).
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were exempt from the Sherman Act under the rule of the Knight case. The
lower court implied, moreover, that even if it had considered the act applicable,
it would have found the association lawful. The judges attached considerable
weight to affidavits presented by the defendants' customers in which the custo-
mers expressed satisfaction with the prices they had been charged. The lower
court was convinced that the defendants had not been able to "raise or main-
tain prices above what is reasonable"9 or, rather, that "in some instances
prices have been above what was probably fair or reasonable, but the proof
fails to show that the average prices have been so."99 All of which meant
that, the Knight principle aside, a combination to set reasonable prices was
reasonable at common law and therefore legal under the Sherman Act.
By the time the Addyston case came up on appeal the Supreme Court had
handed down the Trans-Missouri decision, which undermined the position
that the pipe dealers' combination was lawful because its prices were reason-
able. In reversing the lower court in the Addyston case, however, the circuit
court of appeals did not rely very heavily on Peckham's reasoning. To be
sure, Taft did open his opinion by questioning the defendants' assertion that
they had not violated the act because they had done nothing contrary to
common law. "It might be a sufficient answer to this contention," he wrote,
"to point to the decision of the supreme court of the United States in U.S.
v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n ...in which it was held that contracts in
restraint of interstate transportation were within the statute, whether the
restraints would be regarded as reasonable at common law or not."'100 But
the way Taft phrased Peckham's decision shows that he was uncertain about
its application. He said it "might be," not that it definitely was, a "sufficient
answer"; he represented the rule of the Trans-Missouri case as applying to
"transportation" rather than to the broader subject, "commerce"; and he
thought that some merit might be due the suggestion that Peckham's
decision was more stringent because the defendants were quasi-public cor-
porations than it would have been had ordinary private companies been in-
volved.
Taft preferred to rest the decision on other grounds. An examination of
the common law convinced him, as it had Peckham, that "collateral" or "an-
cillary" restraints of trade were valid. According to Peckham, this was a
ground for excepting them from the general operation of the Sherman Act as
literally interpreted. But Taft emphasized the obverse-that all nonancillary
restraints were void at common law-and in effect concluded that the Sherman
Act need not be thought to go beyond the common law to be given an interpre-
tation as broad as Peckham's.
He therefore devoted the core of his opinion to showing that an agreement
like that among the pipe manufacturers was invalid at common law. His review
of the precedents began with White's historical generalization: in the begin-
98. 7S Fed. at 714.
99. Id. at 715.
100. 85 Fed. at 278.
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ning the common law prohibited all restraints of trade; later, becoming more
flexible, it permitted some. But, Taft said-and here he diverged from the
usual analysis-the exceptions to the rule were all of one sort. They involved
contracts in which the restraint was ancillary to some other main object, such
as the sale of a business or property, the founding or dissolution of a partner-
ship, or the employment of an apprentice or agent. Such contracts had been
upheld when they were reasonable, "reasonableness" being measured in re-
lation to the legitimate object of the contract; so that a restraint attached to
the sale of a business, for instance, would be regarded as reasonable, and unex-
ceptionable, if it offered the buyer only as much protection as was necessary
to preserve the goodwill of the business. 10 1 Taft's interpretation of the cases
implied (contrary to the views of many commentators and especially of Eng-
lish judges) that the common law had not withdrawn its favor from free com-
petition in order to bestow it upon free contract, but had instead promoted
the "free purchase and sale of property" while defending with undiminished
zeal the freedom to compete. For, Taft maintained, reasonable ancillary re-
straints did nothing to diminish competition; a buyer who undertook to observe
such a restraint "was not reducing competition, but was only securing the
seller against an increase of competition of his own creating."
10 2
His view was supported, Taft said, by the fact that the common law regu-
larly invalidated the other category of contracts in restraint of trade, those
"where the sole object of the parties ... is merely to restrain competition."' 03
The restraints imposed by such contracts could not be reasonable because these
contracts had no lawful main purpose to justify the restraint or to serve as a
measure of its reasonableness. If courts undertook to distinguish among them,
the only standard they could apply would be "the vague and varying opinion
of judges as to how much, on principles of political economy, men ought to
be allowed to restrain competition.' 0 4 The fact nevertheless remained that,
in a few cases, some courts had sanctioned nonancillary contracts in restraint
of trade, and Taft now proceeded to show that, in assuming "the power to say
•.. how much restraint of competition is in the public interest," these courts
had mistaken the common-law rules and "set sail on a sea of doubt."'u0
Of the precedents that the defendants in this case and judges in previous
antitrust cases had relied on as authoritative, but that Taft believed erroneous,
he first considered Wickens v. Evans.1° 6 There, the court had approved an
agreement among three trunk makers to partition England into districts in
which each would be the exclusive supplier. The court reasoned that the re-
straint left the trade open to entry by all other persons. The principle of the
decision was the same which Jackson had espoused in the Greene case, and
101. Id. at 280-82.
102. Id. at 281.
103. Id. at 282.
104. Id. at 283.
105. Id. at 284.
106. 3 Y. & J. 318, 148 Eng. Rep. 1201 (Ex. 1829).
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perhaps Taft regarded this as an additional reason for refuting an argument
that would, he said, "validate the most complete local monopoly of the present
day.' 0 7 Not that he denied competition would sooner or later prevail over
monopolies, but he insisted that the law could not idly wait for the eventual
outcome.
It may be, as suggested by the court, that local monopolies cannot en-
dure long, because their very existence tempts outside capital into com-
petition; but the public policy embodied in the common law requires the
discouragement of monopolies, however temporary their existence may
be. The public interest may suffer severely while new competition is
slowly developing.'0 8
In any event, he added, the decision in Wickens v. Evans could not be recon-
ciled with later cases, English as well as American.
Similar reasons prevailed against the other precedents that were supposed
to show that the common law approved as reasonable some outright restraints
of trade.1°9 An English decision, upholding a combination among stevedore
companies, was refuted by an American case suppressing a similar combina-
tion. A Canadian decision favoring a combination of salt manufacturers was
outweighed by the contrary decision of an Ohio court. A Wisconsin decision
was dismissed on account of its age. And a New York decision was disquali-
fied because, resting on the principle "that competition is not invariably a
public benefaction,"" 0 it wrongly left the court discretion to decide how much
competition was beneficent. It also diametrically opposed a Kentucky de-
cision.
The Mogul Steamship case, Taft insisted, did not properly belong among
the other seemingly contrary decisions, although the defendants sought to
place it there. The courts, he said, had not upheld the legality of the steam-
ship combination in that case; they had held that it did not illegally damage
its competitors. Furthermore, several of the judges had said that they would
have refused to enforce the agreement if the case had come up on that issue.
The Mogul decision, therefore, like all the decisions except those few in which
judges had mistakenly strayed, supported the proposition that any agreement
made for the sole purpose of restricting competition was illegal at common law.
And if the Sherman Act followed the common law, it too condemned all such
agreements-all unreasonable ancillary restraints and all direct restraints what-
soever, or, in other words, all unreasonable contracts in restraint of trade and
all combinations in restraint of trade.
Once the decision was grounded on the illegality of all restraints excepf
ancillary restraints, many of the defendants' arguments became irrelevant. In
particular, their plea that the pipe manufacturers' combination must be deemed
reasonable because it charged reasonable prices, and the affidavits to that
107. 85 Fed. at 284.
108. Ibid.
109. Id. at 284-87.
110. Id. at 286.
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effect, were of no avail; for Taft held that, by forming the association, they
had acquired the power to charge unreasonable prices, whether or not they
had thus far chosen to exercise it. But, Taft added, "if it were important,
we should unhesitatingly find that the prices charged in the instances which
were in evidence were unreasonable"; they were far above the cost of pro-
duction and transportation plus a reasonable profit.'
The question yet remained whether this combination, illegal at common
law, was constitutionally subject to the Sherman Act. The defendants strong-
ly urged that it was not, maintaining that, as pipe manufacturers, they much
more nearly resembled the sugar refiners of the Knight case than the rail-
roads in the Trans-Missouri case. Taft flatly rejected this argument. The
Knight case, he held, had been decided for the defendants because the contracts in
question "related only to the manufacture of refined sugar, and not to its
sale throughout the country." 112 The Supreme Court had not meant that any
contract between manufacturers was immune, but only such contracts as
related exclusively to manufacturing. "The obstacle in the way of granting
the relief asked in U.S. v. E. C. Knight Co. was (to use the language
of the chief justice) that 'the contracts and acts of the defendant related
exclusively to the acquisition of the Philadelphia refineries, and the business
of sugar refining in Pennsylvania, and bore no direct relation to commerce
between the states or with foreign nations.' "113 The contracts in this case
were of a quite different sort. They concerned the sale in one state of goods
to be delivered in another, and were "interstate commerce in its strictest
and highest sense" ;114 indeed, they were of the exact kind that Chief Justice
Fuller had designated as most certainly subject to federal regulation, "con-
tracts to buy, sell, or exchange goods to be transported among the several
states.""15 No doubt existed, then, that the defendants had violated the
Sherman Act.
Taft's pruning operation cut away the irregular branches of the common
law and showed that its outlines were very similar to those which Peckham
attributed to the statute. Meanwhile, however, the Supreme Court persisted
in Peckham's analysis of the act.
THE FINAL CASES OF THE DECADE
During 1898 and 1899, Justice Peckham had the opportunity to restate
his doctrine in four more antitrust opinions. In each of these, though he
continued to maintain that the act went beyond the common law, he retreated
from the extreme position he had taken in the Trans-M11issouri case by clarify-
ing his definition of "restraint of trade."
111. Id. at 293.
112. Id. at 296.
113. Id. at 298.
114. Id. at 295.
115. Id. at 297.
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The severity of the Trans-Missouri rule came under serious question in
United States v. Joint Traffic Association,1 1 6 the first of this group of cases.
The defendants argued that if Peckham's interpretation were to prevail, the
act would prohibit a great variety of contracts in restraint of trade that were
admittedly necessary and beneficial. This result, defendants urged, would
unconstitutionally interfere with freedom of contract. In short, either Peck-
ham's interpretation was erroneous or the act was unconstitutional. They
listed, as among these useful and commendable contracts or combinations in
restraint of trade, labor unions, partnerships or corporations formed by per-
sons already engaged in the same business, common selling agencies, an
agreement by which the vendor of a business promised not to compete, and
a covenant restricting the use of real estate. To this, Peckham answered, first,
that as none of the contracts listed was like the defendants' association, their
argument was somewhat beside the point. Moreover, he went on to say, the
argument was not well founded. For instance, the formation of partnerships
and corporations had "never, to our knowledge, been regarded in the nature
of a contract in restraint of trade or commerce.""'' It seems odd that Peck-
ham should have made this appeal to precedent when he explicitly denied
that the common law was an appropriate basis for interpreting the act; this
and similar passages show, however, that he did sometimes invoke common
law as a guide to the meaning of "restraint of trade." Characteristically, he
found guidance in a more literal reading of the statute a moment later when
he said, "It might also be difficult to show that the appointment by two or
more producers of the same person to sell their goods on commission was a
matter in any degree in restraint of trade." This statement implicitly re-
asserted that the proper method to determine whether a contract restrained
trade was not to refer to the common law but rather to decide by a process
of reasoning whether a practice actually restricted the exchange or movement
of goods. Later on, Peckham did outline the nature of restraints, but for
the present he was content to continue his refutation of the argument that
the act, under his interpretation, would prohibit desirable restraints. Taking
up another of the defendants' examples, he pointed out that the sale of a business
with a collateral covenant not to compete was permissible; this type of
contract had been explicitly discussed in the Trans-Missouri opinion and
described there as outside the spirit of the act.118
Having given particular reasons why some contracts were not within the
statutory proscription, he now turned to the general principle which assured
that his interpretation would not render illegal all sorts of other indispensable
and beneficial contracts and combinations. The principle, discussed at length
in another antitrust opinion delivered on the same day, Hopkins v. United
States, °9 was a slightly modified version of the rule which governed the
116. 171 U.S. 505 (1898).
117. Id. at 567.
118. Id. at 568.
119. 171 U.S. 578 (1898).
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Knight case: Peckham held that the act applied only to contracts "whose
direct and immediate effect" was to restrain interstate commerce. This meant,
he said, that "an agreement entered into for the purpose of promoting the
legitimate business of an individual or corporation, with no purpose to there-
by affect or restrain interstate commerce, and which does not directly restrain
such commerce, is not, as we think, covered by the act."'120 The act was still
to be interpreted without reference to common law, but the literal reading
would henceforth be moderated by interpreting "restraint" as "direct and
immediate restraint." In this way, Peckham was using a constitutional cri-
terion to do the same work accomplished by the common-law distinction
between reasonable and unreasonable restraints. A restraint attached to a sale
of property would be lawful under the act, according to Taft, because it was
reasonable and ancillary at common law, and, according to Peckham, because
it had no direct or immediate effect on commerce. A restraint imposed by
a combination of pipe manufacturers was prohibited by the act, in Taft's
view, because it was not ancillary, and therefore not valid at common law,
and, in Peckham's opinion, because it directly and immediately affected com-
merce. Although the content of the rules was different, they might often,
and usually did, lead to the same conclusions. The extent of Peckham's
retreat from the extreme position of the Trans-Missouri opinion is shown by
a passage in the Hopkins decision, which Peckham considered so important
that he quoted it in the Joint Traffic opinion: "The act of Congress must
have a reasonable construction or else there would scarcely be an agreement
or contract among businessmen that could not be said to have, indirectly or
remotely, some bearing upon interstate commerce, and possibly to restrain
it."121
The opinions written by Peckham in the Supreme Court's last four anti-
trust cases of the century-Joint Traffic, Hopkins, Anderson, and Addyston
Pipe-provided a clearer view of how he determined whether an agreement
"directly and immediately" restrained commerce. To interpret restraint of
commerce quite literally, as any reduction in the physical quantity of goods
moving among the states, might lead to ludicrous results. A shipowner who
scrapped a ship, a manufacturer who closed his plant, a laborer who retired-
all of these and many more would appear to have violated the act. Peckham
therefore asked whether the combination complained of actually reduced
competition and thus tended toward monopoly. The Joint Traffic Association
was condemned for this reason. "An agreement of the nature of this one
which directly and effectually stifles competition, must be regarded under the
statute as one in restraint of trade."'12 2 The association in the Anderson case
did not reduce competition and, hence, was lawful.'23 The Addyston Pipe
120. 171 U.S. at 568.
121. Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578, 600 (1898), quoted in 171 U.S. at 568.
122. 171 U.S. at 577.
123. Anderson v. United States, 171 U.S. 604, 614 (1898).
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combination, like that in the Joint Traffic case, was unlawful, however, and
Peckham once again stated the rule:
We have no doubt that where the direct and immediate effect of a
contract or combination among particular dealers in a commodity is to
destroy competition between them and others, so that the parties to the
contract or combination may obtain increased prices for themselves, such
contract or combination amounts to a restraint of trade in the com-
modity, even though contracts to buy such commodity at the enhanced
price are continually being made. 2 4
Although Peckham had begun by insisting that the act meant what its
plain language said, the necessity of applying the statute to concrete situations
had forced him to interpret the plain words. Constitutional considerations
and reflection on the legislative intent suggested the proper interpretation, and
he now understood "every contract in restraint of trade or commerce among
the states" to mean in effect "every contract that directly and immediately
restricts competition and directly affects commerce among the states." It
was this formula which in the main controlled the interpretation of antitrust
cases for the following decade.
124. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 244 (1899).
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